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PRE-TRIAL HURDLES IN CITIZENS'
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
"It's not easy being green.
I. INTRODUCTION

The rise of citizens' groups bringing suit under federal statutes has resulted in more creative claims for relief than the traditional avenue of statutory enforcement.2 Historically, those suing as
environmental citizens have utilized statutory law and Constitutional
claims to further their arguments. 3 However, current case law suggests that the only types of environmental citizen suits that will succeed are those which assert statutory claims.4 The federal courts

have placed a virtual firewall around constitutional claims used to
further environmental objectives, leaving statutory enforcement the
only redress for non-governmental organizations. 5
This note will explore the various ways that environmental citizen
'The Muppet Movie (The Jim Henson Company 1979).
See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle, 502 F. Supp. 213 (D. Md. 1980)

2

(allowing equal protection claim to withstand motion to dismiss); Prisco v. State of New
York, 902 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (deciding Section 1983 claim needed additional
briefing before summary decision); Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Glendening,
174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing Title VI and equal protection claims because of
violation of statute of limitations).
3See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S.
1 (1981) (dismissing Section 1983 claim because precluded by statutory enforcement);
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998) (dismissing Title VI claim); City of Highland Park, i11.
v. Train,
519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975) (dismissing equal protection claim concerning zoning laws).
But see supra note 2 (waffling by several courts on constitutional issues).
4 See infra note 52 (illustrating claim preclusion under section 1983 when statutory
remedy available).
5See supra note 3 (depicting disfavor for constitutional claims).
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groups or individuals can file claims against federal government agencies
for environmental enforcement. Part I will focus on the federal environmental statutes, considering the elements required to get a trial on the
merits by avoiding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Part II
will consider three different constitutional theories for bringing a claim.
Subsection A will discuss the historical value of the equal protection
clause and why there may be a resurgence in its use as part of environmental citizen suits. Subsection B will debate whether groups can utilize
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to bring an environmental claim. Finally, Subsection C will speculate about environmental case law that appears to provide
a cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTORY LAW
Nearly all environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions.6
These provisions allow citizen groups or private citizens to act as private
attorneys general and seek statutory enforcement. 7 While the causes of
6See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1999); Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1999); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1999).
7See Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1999) (allowing any person to
bring suit against any violator including "governmental instrumentality"). The Toxic Substance Control Act ("TSCA") also allows enforcement against the EPA for failure to perform any acts or duties. Id. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §
1270 (1999) (allowing any interested person to bring suit against United States or other
governmental agency pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment). The Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA") also permits a cause of action against state regulatory
officials for failure to perform duties laid out in the statute. Id. See Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1999) (permitting suit against any violator including "governmental instrumentality," and EPA for non-performance of statutory duties). See The
Public Health and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1999) (allowing claim against any person or governmental instrumentality violating statute and EPA for non-performance of
statutory duties). See Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1999) (allowing suit against
any violator including governmental instrumentalities and EPA for non-performance of
statutory duties). The Noise Control Act ("NCA") also permits suit against the Federal
Aviation Administration for failure to act in accordance with the statute. Id. See The Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1999) (allowing any person to bring suit against
any violator, private citizen, or governmental instrumentality). To violate the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), one must be a generator or transporter of hazardous waste or facility that treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste that causes an
imminent and substantial threat to human health and the environment. Id. Under RCRA,
groups may also bring suit against the EPA for failure to enforce the statute. Id. See The
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1999) (allowing suit against any person or governmental
instrumentality violating statute and EPA for non-performance of statutory duties). Suit is
also proper against anyone who builds or operates a facility that does not have a permit or
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action for the different citizen suit provisions are different, they have identical standing requirements. 8
Before a plaintiff group can file a suit, they must send a notice letter to the violator and agencies in charge of enforcement. 9 If the particular
statute the group seeks to enforce confers enforcement authority to the
state, the group must also notify any state agency charged with environmental enforcement responsibilities.' 0 The purpose of the notice requirement is to give the violator an opportunity to make a good faith effort to
come into compliance with the relevant environmental statute of which it
is in violation and to give the agency a chance to enforce any violations of
which it previously was ignorant.' Formerly, if a violator did come into
statutory compliance or the enforcement agency commenced action against
the violator, any suit filed after the sixty-day notice period was dismissed
as moot. 12
violates the conditions of the permit. Id. See Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1999) (allowing suit against anyone in
violation of statute). Included in the mix of possible defendants are governmental instrumentalities, the United States President, and any other officer of the United States. Id. See
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1999) (allowing any person to bring suit against facility violating statue). Under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, ("EPCRA"), groups can sue the EPA for
failure to enforce the provisions of the statue and state governments for failure to make
certain information available. Id.
8 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1999) (outlining prima facie CERCLA violation).
A prima facie case under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") involves proving that an owner or operator of a facility disposed of hazardous substances that caused a release or threat of release to human health and
the environment. Id. A prima facie case under the Clean Water Act would involve proving
that a facility violated the terms of its NPDES permit. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(1999). These factors do not change the steps that citizen groups need to take before they
are allowed to try a case on the merits of these claims. See supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1999); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §
7604(b)(l)(A) (1999); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1) (1999) (requiring 60 day notice).
10See, e.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1999); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1999);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1999). Each of these statutes either empowers the states to act in
the role of the EPA in enforcing the statues or permits states to have concurrent enforcement statutes as long as the standards enumerated by the state statutes are equally as stringent as their federal counterparts. Id.
" See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
59-60 (1987) (finding suit unnecessary if violator comes into compliance).
12 See id. at 60. The court in Gwaltney interpreted through Senate Reports about the
Clean Water Act that if citizen suits were allowed after the government began enforcement
action, the suit would "supplant" rather than "supplement" governmental action. Id. The
Court held that "[plermitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit." Id. See also Steel Co. v.
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The first pre-trial burden for citizen groups is a showing of Article
Three standing. 13 A claim will pass Article Three muster when it asserts
"injury in fact."' 4 The claim must also assert a connection between the
injury and the conduct of the defendant.15 Finally, prevailing on the claim
must remedy the plaintiff's injury. 16 Unless the plaintiff asserts these three
elements in the complaint, the court will dismiss the suit. 17
The second pre-trial burden is ensuring the organization filing the
claim truly represents the wishes of its members.18 Here, there is also a
three-prong test.19 Individuals must have the ability to sue alone, the suit
must be within the scope of the organization, and the individuals must not
be required to participate in the litigation. 20 Also, the group must assert
that there are ongoing violations, either continuous or intermittent, occurCitizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (finding injunctive relief and civil
penalties improper for redressing EPCRA violations). But see Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding case not moot if
violator comes into compliance while suit pending); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v.
Pan American Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging substance of
claim for civil penalties regardless of violator's compliance); Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990) (determining civil penalties appropriate for past and continuous violations).
13 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (explaining three part
test
to determine standing).
14See id. at 560. The "injury in fact" must be "concrete and particularized," as well
as "actual and imminent" as opposed to "'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Id.
15See id. (setting standard for finding connection). The link between the injury and
the conduct of the defendant must be "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of some kind of third party not before
the court." Id. at 560 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976)).
16 See id. Finally, "it must be 'likely' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
17See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871, 899-900 (1990) (finding use
by members of "unspecified portions of ...immense tract of territory" not particularized
and actual) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (refusing to find
"injury in fact" for "some day intentions" to visit effected area).
18 See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(recognizing three-prong test to determine standing).
19See id. at 343 (outlining three-prong test).
20See id. (depicting requirements for standing). The Court found that the requirements for standing were (1) the group's "members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right;" (2) "the interest it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose;" and (3) "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit." Id.
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ring at the time the suit was filed. 21 A court will not hear a claim for
"wholly past violations. 22
The final obstacle to avoiding pre-trial dismissal is surviving a
claim of mootness.23 If it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur," a case may become
moot. 24 If the violations that spark the claim cease at the time of notifica-

tion and the violator comes into compliance before the suit is filed, the
case becomes moot for purposes of awarding injunctive relief.25 However,
a claim for civil penalties is not moot. 26 Keeping the civil penalty is akin

to punitive damages in a tort claim, in that it deters violators from committing further violations.27
By asserting in the claim the three proceeding elements, Article III
standing, statutory standing, and a claim that is well established, the group
should be able to survive a motion to dismiss and receive a trial on the
merits.2 8
A recent example of a successful statutory claim is the case of
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,29 involving a violation of the Clean Water Act. In that case, the defendant
violated its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit by discharging amounts of mercury in excess of its NPDES permit
into the North Tyger River. 30 The court granted Article Three standing
because affidavits supplied by members of Friends of the Earth stated that
they used to fish, swim, and otherwise utilize the river but because of the
21See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64 (allowing claim for "good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation").
22 See id. at 64 (holding wholly past violations of Clean Water Act inactionable).
23

See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199 (1968)

(outlining boundaries of mootness doctrine).
24 See id. at 203 (stating burden of proof on party defending mootnness assertion).
25 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109-110 (denying claim for injunctive relief for past
violations of statute).
26 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env'tl. Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000) (finding court can award civil penalties for past, present, and future violations).
27

See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (giving factors considered by leg-

islature). The Tull Court found that "retribution and deterrence" were factors considered
during legislative debates on the Clean Water Act. Id. at 422. The Court opined that civil
penalties would "deter future violations by basing the penalty on its economic impact." /d.
at 423.
28 See infra notes 29-37 discussing the Laidlaw decision.
29 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
30See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 701.
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additional mercury pollution, they had refrained and would continue to
refrain from doing so 32in the future. 3' The court deemed the affidavits to
prove "injury in fact.
After learning of repeated violations, FOE sent Laidlaw a notice
letter and waited sixty days to file suit. 33 Between the time the letter was
received and the suit was filed, Laidlaw came into compliance and settled
a complaint with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and subsequently brought a motion to dismiss. 34 However, since Laidlaw continued to intermittently violate its NPDES permit
throughout the notice period after FOE filed suit, the court found that
FOE's claim was not based on wholly past violations. Therefore, the court
held that FOE was eligible for relief. 35 While Laidlaw's compliance with

the DHEC and subsequent closing of its facility made the claim for injunctive relief moot, civil penalties were still available to deter future violations. 36 Since FOE proved injury in fact through the affidavits of its
members, standing through Laidlaw's continuing violations, and a substantive claim for civil penalties, they prevailed.37

31See id. at 705-6. InLaidlaw, the Court focused on six members of Friends of the

Earth who testified as to injury in fact. Id. The injuries claimed by the affiants were loss of
fishing, camping, swimming, and picnicking areas; loss of walking and bird watching trails;
loss of a place to go boating: and fear of moving near the Laidlaw facility and a reduction
in the value of homes around the Laidlaw facility and downstream from it. Id.
32 See id. at 705-6. The Court opined that "plaintiff's adequately allege injury in fact
when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and
recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the challenged activity." Id. (quoting
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
33
See Id. at 701.
34See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 701. There was some evidence of collusion between
Laidlaw and DHEC. Id. Laidlaw contacted DHEC and asked DHEC to file a lawsuit
against it. Id. DHEC accepted the offer and Laidlaw's attorneys drafted the complaint for
DHEC, and the day before the 60-day waiting period for filing suit was over, the two parties settled. Id. With Laidlaw paying only $100,000 in penalties and agreeing to "make
every effort to comply with its permit obligations," it seems to have gotten the better end of
a bargain. Id. But see supra notes 21 and 25 (holding claim is moot when only for past
violations).
"5See id. at 700.
36 See id. at 706. The court reasoned that it could not enjoin behavior that already
ceased, but it could deter future violations of the same company at different locations. Id.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Tull by stating that civil penalties "promote immediate
compliance by limiting the defendant's economic incentive to delay its attainment of permit
limits; they also deter future violations." Id.
17See id. at 700.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

A. Equal Protection
To bring an equal protection claim, the plaintiff group must prove
that the action of the agency was without any rational basis connecting the
alleged discriminatory act to a proper governmental purpose. 38 The "rational basis" standard of review for actions of government agencies is
quite stringent.39 If a plaintiff can prove that the governmental agency
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the equal protection claim will
survive a motion to dismiss. 40
Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle is a case in which a citizen
group brought suit based on an equal protection theory.4' In Chesapeake
Bay, the plaintiff, a developing company, brought suit alleging violations
of the FWPCA and the Constitution for irregularities in the process for
obtaining a permit to build a sewerage treatment facility. 42

The plaintiff

alleged it suffered injury because population studies included in the report
did not take into account its planned development of a significant amount
of land, and because Administrators unduly delayed the building of the
facility.4 3 The plaintiff's equal protection count accused the defendants of
38 See

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (applying ra-

tional basis review in case concerning environmental issues). This level of review presumes
the absence of a suspect class. Id. at 461. The presence of a suspect class, race for example,
triggers strict scrutiny review. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The
question then becomes whether the government had a compelling reason to act in the manner it did. Id. at 216. See also infra notes 65-68 discussing Arlington Heights.
39 See Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle, 502 F. Supp. 213, 226 (D.M.D. 1980).
The court held that "[u]nder the rational basis test, the state and country defendants may not
exercise their authority in an arbitrary and capricious, or unreasonable manner." Id.
40 See id. (maintaining equal protection claim requires showing governmental action
not rationally related to governmental purpose). Since the facts in the plaintiff's complaint
gave rise to an irrational relationship, the court refused to summarily dismiss the claim. Id.
See also infra note 43 (discussing Chesapeake Bay case). But see City of Highland Park, Ill.
v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975). In this case, the city sued the Administrator of the
EPA over zoning regulations under an equal protection theory. Id. at 683. The court held
that zoning laws have the capability of always harming one group over another. Id. at 696.
The court found that "[i]nherent in all zoning legislation are statutory distinctions which
give rise to claims of disparity of treatment." Id. This "disparity of treatment" alone, however, was not enough to trigger rational basis review. Id.
41 Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc., 502 F. Supp. at 213.

42 Id at 218.
43 See id. at 218 (outlining allegations). The plaintiffs complaint alleged, inter alia,
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"arbitrary and capricious" behavior in denying the plaintiff "equal access
to planned public facilities." 44
The Maryland District Court announced that rational basis review
was the proper standard of review for the equal protection count. 4 5 The
issue thus became whether the defendants exercised "their authority in an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner." 46 Since the plaintiff alleged in good faith all of these allegations, the Court would not dismiss the
complaint. 47 However, Chesapeake Bay Village couched its equal protection claim in terms of a taking under eminent domain which the Court
found reasonable and thereby dismissed the equal protection count.48
B. 42 U.S.C. §1983 Civil Action For Deprivationof Rights
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against people who deprive the "rights, privileges, or immunities" of another through statutes or
regulations of the United States.49 Citizen groups generally bring §1983
claims concurrently with other statutory violations. 50 To successfully assert this type of claim, the plaintiff group must prove the §1983 claim will
redress different wrongs than the concurrent statutory enforcement. 5' If
that the "defendants used, or permitted the use of, grossly inaccurate population projections
in connection with proposal submitted to" the EPA, and they did this to deny the plaintiff
"access to adequate sewage facilities for its proposed development." Id. at 226. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the "defendants plan to condemn plaintiffs land for a public
park, and purposely delayed the building of sewage treatment facilities ...to lower the
value of plaintiffs land." Id. at 226.
44See id.
45See Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc., 502 F. Supp. at 226.
46See id. (applying rational basis review).
47See id (analyzing substantive due process/equal protection claim).
48See id. at 227 (taking defined as using eminent domain for public benefit).
4942 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute states in pertinent part:

[e]very person who ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... " Id.
50 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n.,
453 U.S. 1 (1981) (bringing §1983 claim concurrently with Clean Water Act violation);
Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. United States Env'tl. Prot. Agency, 732 F.2d 1167 (3d
Cir. 1984) (bringing § 1983 claim concurrently with Clean Water Act violation); Prisco v.
State of New York, 902 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (bringing §1983 claim concurrently
with CERCLA violation).
51See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-21 (describing two-prong test). In
National Sea Clammers, the Court described a two-prong test that it set out in Pennhurst
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the relevant statute is found to be comprehensive, then it will provide the
exclusive remedy for any injury associated with it. 52 This statutory exclusivity makes bringing a §1983 claim difficult in the environmental arena,
53
as environmental statutes are usually held to be comprehensive in nature.
Therefore, courts consider relief sought under the statute the same relief
sought under § 1983.54
While a §1983 claim is weaker when brought concurrently with a
FWPCA violation, it should not be precluded when brought with other
environmental statutes.
For instance, the plaintiff in Prisco v. State of
New York brought a §1983 claim concurrently with allegations of
CERCLA and RCRA violations, making an interesting case study.56 In
Prisco,the plaintiff brought suit because the defendants used a piece of her
57
property illegally as a dump which contained hazardous contaminants.
The plaintiff used this scenario to allege a § 1983 claim. 58 The defendants
argued that under the National Sea Clammers Doctrine, CERCLA and
RCRA foreclosed the plaintiff's remedy under § 1983. 59
While conceding to the defendants that the National Sea Clammers
State School and Hospital v. Haldermen. Id. at 19 (citing Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28). The test asks "(i) whether Congress had foreclosed
private enforcement of that statute in the enactment [of the statute] itself, and (ii) whether
the statute at issue ... was the kind that created enforceable rights." hi. The Court never
reached the second question because it found "that Congress foreclosed a §1983 remedy
under" the Clean Water Act. Id.
52 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20 (depicting section 1983 claim preclusion). The Court stated "[wihen the remedial devices provided in a particular act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude
the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id.
53 See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21. The court alluded to the
fact that
because the FWPCA had a citizen suit provision Congress would not have preserved a right
to a § 1983 claim. Id. at 20. Further, the Court concluded that "the express remedies demonstrate[d] not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that
it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under §1983." Id. at
21.
54 See Brewer, 577 F. Supp. at 530 (claiming violation of FWPCA and §1983). The
Court dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 claim because "[tlhe relief which the plaintiff's [sought]
under Section 1983 [was] identical to that sought under the FWPCA." Id.
55 See supra notes 51-53 (discussing claims brought under FWPCA are comprehensive and therefore preclude § 1983 claim)
56 902 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
57
1d. at
58

409.
1d.
59 See id. at 410 (attempting to distinguish between constitutional and statutory
rights).
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Doctrine did prelude a §1983 claim when a statute redressed the same
claim, the court questioned whether "preclusion extends to §1983 actions
... brought alongside or in the place of statutory actions." 6 The Court
then discussed two cases that held RCRA claims precluded constitutional
claims. 6 1 Posing two questions, the court reasoned that it should inquire
into whether the § 1983 claim is an "independent constitutional cause of
action, or ... merely a rehash of ... statutory claims" and whether "Congress intended RCRA and CERCLA to be the exclusive avenues through
which the plaintiff may assert the type of constitutional claims ... alleged
under §1983. "62 Since neither side had briefed the issue, the Court would
not render a decision on the issue.63 However, the Court did express doubt
about the viability of the § 1983 claim in light of the CERCLA claim.
C. Title VI §§601 and 602
The Supreme Court has only decided one environmental case
brought under the guise of Title VI. Arlington Heights set out the test to
determine whether there was a violation of § 601. 64 The Court held that to
prove an actionable claim under § 601, the plaintiff must prove that the
agency decision had both a discriminatory impact on the plaintiff group
and that the agency acted with discriminatory intent. 65 Courts interpreting
this decision emphasize the importance of the intent element. 66 In fact,
60

See Prisco, 902 F. Supp. at 410. The court went on to infer that "[i]f the constitu-

tional claim is merely the statutory claim clothed in the language of constitutional violations, it is more likely to be precluded under the statutory scheme." Id.
61 See Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 83 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding "RCRA's
citizen suit provision foreclosed §1983 action to enforce statute"); Reeger v. Mill Service,
Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Penn. 1984) (finding "RCRA and other environmental statutes foreclosed civil rights actions").
62 See Prisco, 902 F. Supp. at 410.
63 See id.
64 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 253. The Court's decision in Arlington Heights
was predicated on the decision of Washington v. Davis, where to prove a violation of Title
VI § 601, plaintiffs had to prove the governmental action had a disproportionate impact and
that the government acted with discriminatory intent. Id.
65 See id.
66 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 564-65. The Court outlined some factors
where evidence of discriminatory intent may be found, if the action "bears more heavily on
one race than another," if there is a "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race," the historical background of the agency decision, "[t]he specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision," and "the legislative or administrative history" of the
decision. Id.
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under present environmental case law, no group has ever satisfied this
element.67
There is some speculation over whether a group may bring a claim
under § 602 of Title VI. 68 Section 602 allows a plaintiff group to assert a
claim against a federal agency for having promulgated, enforced, or supported regulations that have a discriminatory impact. 69 This lowers the
evidentiary bar for proving intent and allows plaintiffs to use one prong of
the intent/impact test.7 ° While no court has reached the merits of a claim
brought under § 602, the courts who have addressed it believe that a successful claim may be possible.7'
72
Finally, in South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy,
67

See South Bronx Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp.2d 565

(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing claim under § 601 because no discriminatory intent); Jersey
Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing Title
VI claim because violative of statute of limitations).
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. The statute provides in pertinent part that "[e]ach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to
any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the
statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." Id.
69See South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, 20 F. Supp.2d at 572 (stating § 602 prohibits federal agencies from promulgating regulations with discriminatory impact). But see
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (claim
brought under § 602). When the case came before the Supreme Court, it was vacated and
remanded with an order to dismiss. Id.
70 See South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, 20 F. Supp.2d at 572. The court, citing

Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., set forth a three-part factual determination for
meeting the disparate impact burden. Id. (citing Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.,
997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (1 1th Cir. 1993). First, the plaintiff must "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice has a disproportionate adverse effect
on a group protected by Title VI." Id. If accomplished, "the defendant then must prove that
there exists a substantial legitimate justification for the challenged practice in order to avoid
liability." Id. Finally, "the plaintiff will still prevail if able to show that there exists a comparably effective alternative practice which would result in less disproportionality, or that
the defendant's proffered justification is a pretext for discrimination." Id. Basically, the
plaintiff has to "demonstrate a causal link between the defendant's challenged practice and
the disparate impact identified." Id.
71See South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, 20 F. Supp.2d at 572. Although
the
South Bronx Court queried that because of Chester Residents, there remained no "private
right of action under Section 602," instead of dismissing the claim as non existent, it dismissed the claim for want of evidence. Id. The Court abstained from answering the substantive question of whether there is a "private right of action under Section 602." Id.
72 See 20 F. Supp.2d at 565.
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developers cited a large industrial, waste transfer, and bus depot development in a primarily minority neighborhood.73 Two Environmental Impact
Statements showed there would be no adverse effects on the air quality in
the area as a result of the new construction.74 The gravamen of the Title
VI complaint was that "minority residents of the Bronx [would] suffer the
noxious effects of garbage to a greater degree than the mostly white resident of Long Island" (where the garbage came from).75
The Court cursorily dismissed the Title VI § 601 complaint because
the plaintiffs failed to bring any substantial allegations of discriminatory
intent.76 However, the Court found the Title VI § 602 complaint to have
some merit.77 As evidentiary support of discriminatory impact needed to
bring a § 602 claim, the plaintiffs established that seventy-nine percent of
the area's population were minorities, that the area has one of the highest
rates of asthma in the country, that seventeen percent of the children in the
community suffer from asthma, and the neighborhood is mainly poor and
minority as opposed to the primarily white and middle class communities
found on Long Island.78 Unfortunately, the Court found this evidence
lacking in support of discriminatory impact, and citing plaintiff's counsel's
concession at oral argument
that the Title VI claim was their weakest,
79
dismissed the claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, citizen enforcement of federal environmental statutes may be the easiest route to accomplishing the goal of protecting one's
neighborhood from many ecological and public health conundrums. To
assert a claim under a federal statute, the plaintiff group must send a notice
letter to the violator and any agencies involved in the enforcement of the
73

Id. at 576-579.

74Id.
75See id. at 571-72.
76 See id. at 572. The court found that the "plaintiffs have offered only 'general' and
'conclusory' allegations and their Title VI intentional discrimination [was] therefore dismissed." Id.
77See id. at 573. The court would not reach the question of whether § 602 gave parties a private right under which to sue after the decision in Chester Residents. Id.
78See South Bronx Coalitionfor Clean Air, 20 F. Supp.2d at 573.
79See id. at 573. The court noted that it would have liked to see "analytical comparison[s] of the subject locations with regard to (1) racial and ethnic composition; (2)
volume of waste transferred; (3) volume of waste generated; (4) costs of waste haulage; (5)
environmental effects of waste haulage, or (6) health effects of waste "haulage." Id.
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particular statute. The group may file suit sixty days after receipt of the
notice letter. Upon filing suit, the group must be ready to show Article
Three standing through injury in fact, the connection between the violator
and the injury suffered, and how the claim will remedy the injury. Further
the group must also be ready to support statutory standing by showing the
individuals have the ability to sue alone, suit is aligned with the purpose of
the organization and individual participation is not required. Lastly, the
mootness doctrine is less problematic after the Laidlaw decision because if
there is a reasonable chance that the misconduct will reoccur, a court can
enforce a claim even after a violator has come into statutory compliance.
On the constitutional front, citizen environmental claims are not
often successful. Current case law seems to preclude enforcement of environmental wrongs under equal protection, § 1983 and Title VI § 601 type
claims. However, the Title VI, § 602 claim seems quite promising. Under
the right set of facts, courts seem willing to entertain such novelties.
Gayann Barbella Crowe

